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The Evolution of Human Life Expectancy and Intelligence in
Hunter-Gatherer Economies
By ARTHUR J. ROBSON AND HILLARD S. KAPLAN*
The economics of hunting and gathering must have driven the biological evolution
of human characteristics, since hunter-gatherer societies prevailed for the two
million years of human history. These societies feature huge intergenerational
resource  ows, suggesting that these resource  ows should replace fertility as the
key demographic consideration. It is then theoretically expected that life expectancy
and brain size would increase simultaneously, as apparently occurred during our
evolutionary history. The brain here is considered as a direct form of bodily
investment, but also crucially as facilitating further indirect investment by means of
learning-by-doing. (JEL A12, J10, P00)
This paper adopts an alternative view of the
relationship between economics and biology.
Rather than viewing human biological charac-
teristics as effectively exogenous determinants
of economic phenomena, we consider how the
economics of hunter-gatherer societies shaped
economically relevant human biological charac-
teristics by means of natural selection.1
In particular, we examine why intelligence
and life expectancy were simultaneously exag-
gerated in human evolutionary history. Indeed
these variables are robustly associated across
living species, and across primates, in particu-
lar. For example, a human brain is at least three
times bigger than that of a chimpanzee and
humans live about two times longer. To explain
this close connection between intelligence and
life expectancy, this paper models the brain as a
form of capital. It then derives the dynamic
paths of investment and of expenditure to re-
duce mortality, so to better reap the returns on
such investment. In addition to new insights
into human origins and characteristics, this in-
tegration of biology, anthropology, and eco-
nomics suggests a new approach to economic
questions, such as those related to altruism in
families, and to age effects on time preference
and risk aversion.
Section I of the paper provides the relevant
biological and anthropological background. It
discusses natural selection of somatic (bodily)
tissue, focusing on the brain, mortality rates,
and life expectancy. It presents empirical evi-
dence that human evolution has exaggerated
both brain size and life expectancy. Further-
more, it shows that the economies of hunter-
gatherers rely on skill-intensive food production
strategies that would not be viable without mas-
sive intergenerational resource  ows and excep-
tional adult life expectancy.
To address this simultaneous exaggeration of
brain size and life expectancy, we consider two
models. Model 1, in Section II, considers how
any somatic investment is related to optimal
mortality reduction. Energy production is a
function of a somatic capital stock, where this
stock can be increased by reinvestment of en-
ergy; mortality depends on the energy allocated
to mortality reduction.We show that an optimal
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1 To some extent, the present approach is then consistent
with that of Gary S. Becker (1991, for example), who
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ena. See also Haim Ofek (2001). Robson (2001) advocates
consideration of the connection between biology and
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life history has an initial investment phase dur-
ing which mortality falls, followed by a station-
ary state with constant mortality. Greater
productivity of the somatic capital stock, or a
decrease in extrinsic mortality, leads to longer
life expectancy and a higher long-run stock.
The brain has distinctive properties as a so-
matic stock that are implied by the observations
of hunter-gatherer societies but not fully cap-
tured by Model 1. That is, the overall lifetime
investment associated with the brain seems to
have two interrelated stages. In the  rst of these
stages, metabolic resources build brain tissue
itself, as with any somatic tissue. What distin-
guishes investment in the brain qualitatively
from other forms of somatic investment, how-
ever, is that a larger brain does not immediately
imply higher output. Rather, in the second stage
of overall investment, a larger brain makes
learning more effective. This induces a steeper
rise in productivity over time since cognitively
demanding activities such as hunting and gath-
ering now become more productive with
practice.
Model 2, in Section III, is tailored to focus on
this second stage of investment. Somatic invest-
ment in the brain is con ned to an initial period.
Production is a function of time as well as of the
brain as a neural capital stock. For any given
size of this stock, production initially rises over
time, thus capturing learning-by-doing. In a ter-
minal stage, production falls, thus also allowing
for aging. We show that these assumptions im-
ply U-shaped mortality, the typical biological
pattern. The advent of a more learning-intensive
environment leads to the simultaneous exagger-
ation of longevity and intelligence, as does a re-
duction in extrinsic mortality. It is  nally shown
how pro les of net output that stem from greater
somatic investment in the brain may imply
mortality pro les that are “rectangularized”—
U-shaped rather than V-shaped.
Section IV concludes with a discussion of
other applications of this synthesis of biology,
anthropology, and economics. For example,
Models 1 and 2 are also relevant to voluntary
choice as well as long-term evolution and so
apply to the interrelationship between health
and educational investments, for example. Per-
haps the most promising further applications,
however, consider the biological shaping of in-
tergenerational altruism, time preference, and
risk aversion as functions of age. Finally, it is
argued that these models suggest why new re-
search is desirable on the theory of aging, either
for organisms or machines.
I. Biological and Anthropological Background
A. Life History Theory and the
Economics of Energy
Life history theory is the branch of biology
that considers how evolution shapes the timing
of life events. Central here is explaining how
the optimal timing of growth and reproduction
depends on energy production and mortality
rates. (See Stephen C. Stearns, 1992, for exam-
ple.) The fundamental trade-off is between cur-
rent and future reproduction. By growing, an
organism can increase future energy intake
and thus future fertility. Similarly, a repeatedly
reproducing organism should reserve some en-
ergy during reproduction for health mainte-
nance so that it can live to reproduce again.
Over the entire lifetime, natural selection
would, in some circumstances, maximize to-
tal expected energy surplus available for
reproduction.
Growth of any type of body tissue can be
seen as investment in somatic capital. Since
such stocks tend to depreciate over time, main-
tenance can also be seen as investment. In a
physical sense, somatic capital includes orga-
nized tissue such as muscles or the brain. In a
functional sense, somatic capital includes
strength, coordination, skill, and knowledge.
Thus, the present-future reproductive trade-off
can be viewed as current reproduction versus
investment in somatic capital.
Although life history models often have an
underlying logic of investment, economic the-
ory has not been fully exploited here. A contri-
bution of the present paper is then to apply the
economic theory of capital to somatic invest-
ment in the brain. Moreover, despite the cen-
trality of mortality pro les to life history, these
have usually been treated as exogenous. An-
other contribution of the present paper is then to
consider how natural selection shaped the pro-
 le of mortality rates and hence affected life
expectancy. The basis of this explanation is the
variation of economic value of life over the life
span. Most signi cantly, perhaps, the current
approach can then explain why intelligence
and life expectancy would “coevolve,” or be
151VOL. 93 NO. 1 ROBSON AND KAPLAN: EVOLUTION IN HUNTER-GATHERER ECONOMIES
simultaneously exaggerated. These two charac-
teristics of humans are now considered further.
B. Natural Selection on the Brain
and Life Expectancy
The brain is a special form of somatic capital.
On the one hand, neural tissue monitors the
organism’s internal and external environment,
and induces immediate physiological and be-
havioral responses. Presumably for this reason,
there is a strong tendency for brain size to
increase with body size. More relevantly here,
the brain also transforms present experiences
into future performance by means of learning.
To assess the relationship of this function with
brain size, it is necessary to control for body
weight, and a typical means of doing this is as
follows. Regression of the logarithm of brain
weight on the logarithm of body weight across
all mammals yields a highly signi cant “allo-
metric” coef cient of 0.76. Robert D. Martin’s
(1981) “encephalization quotient,” EQ, is then
the actual brain weight relative to the brain
weight predicted from body weight, or EQ 5
(Brain weight)/11.22 3 (Body weight)0.76. Pri-
mates, especially monkeys and apes, have
higher EQs than other mammals. More specif-
ically, it is the neocortex that is exaggerated in
primates. Comparisons across primate species
show that the relative size of the brain and,
especially, of the neocortex, are associated with
the duration of cognitive development and the
highest levels of cognition attained. (See Harry
J. Jerison, 1973; Sue T. Parker and Michael L.
McKinney, 1999.)
The action of natural selection on the neural
capital involved in memory and learning de-
pends on the bene ts and costs arising over the
organism’s lifetime. The bene ts of learning
arise from increased productivity that occurs
mainly when the organism is relatively old,
perhaps well beyond the age at which the ben-
e ts of overall body size peak. On the other
hand, although there are substantial energetic
costs of maintaining the brain throughout life,
brain growth itself is heavily concentrated in the
earliest years. Altogether, in the  rst year of
human life, about 65 percent of all resting en-
ergetic expenditure is devoted to the growth and
maintenance of the brain (Malcolm A. Holliday,
1978). Thus there is a huge time lag between the
incurring of the direct metabolic cost of a large
brain and the ultimate payback in the form of
higher output. Investment in the brain is, in this
sense, a more “roundabout” biological strategy
than is investment in the body in general.
Since the brain increases future productivity,
the expected return from the initial investment
depends crucially on the probabilities of being
alive in the future. Such survival probabilities
are also subject to natural selection. The effec-
tiveness of the immune system, for example,
depends on the metabolic energy devoted to
building and maintaining the antibodies for de-
fense against pathogens.
There is, indeed, a strong empirical relation-
ship between brain size and life expectancy.
(John Allman et al., 1993, show that brain size
signi cantly in uences life span, controlling for
body size, and Robert A. Barton, 1999, summa-
rizes the literature.) Such a relationship for pri-
mates can be shown independently as follows.2
There are 234 species of primates, altogether,
but data on life span, body weight, and brain
weight could be obtained for only 101 of these,
apart from humans.3 We found that the partial
correlation between the logarithm of brain
weight (LBRWT) and the logarithm of maxi-
mum life (LNMAX), while controlling for the
logarithm of body weight (LNBW), is 0.4655,
with a signi cance level of zero to three decimal
places. Moreover, brain weight seems to have
a more substantial effect in promoting longev-
ity than does body weight, while allowing for the
strong in uence of body weight on brain weight.
An instrumental variables approach, where the
exogenous instruments are the logarithms of body
weight, range size, and the percentage of fruit in
the diet, as well as the evolutionary category or
grade, yields the following result: LNMAX 5
23.084
(8.584)
1 0.516
(3.696)
LNBRWT 20.222
(22.075)
LNBW. In-
deed, body size has a negative estimated effect
on maximum life in this structural equation. The
t-statistics are given in parentheses; adjusted R2
2 These effects are not at all limited to primates, but also
arise in birds. Parrots, for example, engage in a great deal of
extractive foraging. They are also extreme among birds in
terms of both relative brain size and longevity. Terrestrial
galliforms, such as quail, that simply peck at foods on the
ground are much shorter-lived and smaller-brained. (See
Kaplan and Robson, 2002.)
3 The  gure of 234, which includes humans, is from
Noel Rowe (1996). Humans were omitted here to allay any
suspicion that the results relied on this single observation of
both high brain weight and great life expectancy.
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is 0.446. The coef cient of LNBRWT, in par-
ticular, has a signi cance level of zero to three
decimal places.
C. The Human Case
Interest in the interaction between intelli-
gence and life expectancy is enhanced by what
is known about human evolutionary history.
Within primates in general, there have been
three shifts to longer lives and larger brains—
from prosimians to monkeys, from monkeys to
apes and, of particular interest, from apes to
humans.
Our genus Homo has indeed only existed for
about two million years. Figure 1 shows the
dramatic shift from an EQ of just over two for
earlier hominids, represented by Australopithe-
cus boisei, to 3.5 for the earliest Homo. It also
exhibits the subsequent rapid increase of EQ in
Homo, especially during the second half of this
period. Much of this hominid brain expansion
occurred in the neocortex, the part of the brain
most implicated in cognitive ability. It is likely
that part of the resulting increase in human
intelligence is due to reorganization of brain
tissue rather than weight per se. Possibly for this
reason, the small differences in brain weight
within modern humans may be only weakly
correlated with intelligence.Nevertheless, these
large increases in brain size on the species level
are almost certainly associated with increased
learning and information-processing abilities.
(See Simon M. Reader and Kevin N. Laland,
2002.)
Life spans of extinct species are not directly
observable, of course. Nevertheless, indirect ev-
idence suggests that the life span of Australo-
pithecus was much less than that of modern
humans, being comparable instead to that of
modern chimpanzees, with early species in the
genus Homo having intermediate life spans.
(See B. Holly Smith, 1991, for example.)
What environmental shift might have in-
duced these increases in encephalization and
life span? Why would this shift have affected
humans rather than chimpanzees, for example?
In the  rst place, the shift to bipedalism already
evident in Australopithecus almost certainly re-
 ected greater time in more open, less-forested
habitats. Bipedal walking is more energetically
ef cient than knuckle walking, but is disadvan-
tageous in the trees. At the beginning of the
Pleistocene about two million years ago, lower
rainfall led to the emergence of large savannahs,
where the animal biomass increased dramati-
cally and many plants evolved to store energy in
the form of tubers and nuts. This opened up a
new niche in which a bipedal ape had a com-
parative advantage. With free hands and an al-
ready considerable intelligence, early hominids
could extract these tubers and nuts. Hunting and
scavenging opportunities also increased with
animal density, and hominids began to special-
ize in a niche emphasizing large, calorie-rich
plants and animals. (See Robert Jurmain et al.,
2000, for example.) Such  lling of a new evo-
lutionary niche may be analogous to how  rms
with existing relevant physical and human cap-
ital assets might have a comparative advantage
in the production of a new product.
The main point is that, compared to other
primates and mammals, human foragers use the
most skillful and learning-intensive techniques
to get the most nutrient-dense food from the
environment. When they gather, humans use
digging sticks to obtain underground tubers,
stones and other tools to extract protein-rich
nuts, and use complex methods to leach poisons
out of energy-rich foodstuffs.
Human hunting is particularly cognitively de-
manding, applying techniques that are varied and
creative. Kaplan et al. (2000, p. 171) contains the
following examples of these techniques among
the Ache, Hiwi, Machiguenga, and Yora:
Arboreal animals are shot with arrows from
the ground or in a tree, driven by climbing,
shaken down from branches, frightened
into jumping to the ground, brought down
by felling the tree with an axe, lured by
imitating calls, lured by making captured
infants emit distress calls, captured by
spreading sticky resin on branches to trap
FIGURE 1. HOMINID BRAIN SIZE AND BODY WEIGHT
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them, and captured by constructing scaf-
folding from tree branches and vines.
Ground dwelling prey are shot with ar-
rows, driven to other hunters or capture
devices, run down upon encounter,
slammed to death against the ground, stran-
gled around the neck, or suffocated by step-
ping on them while trapping them in a tight
spot. Burrowing prey are dug out, chopped
out of tree trunks, stabbed through the
ground with spears, frightened to the point
they bolt from the burrow, smoked out, and
captured by introducing a lasso through a
small hole. Aquatic prey are shot on the
surface, driven into traps, poisoned, shot
below the surface, discovered on muddy
bottoms by systematically poking the bot-
tom of a pond, and speared underwater by
random thrusts in drying lakes.
The wide diversity of behavior here would be
prohibitively expensive for evolution to pro-
gram directly; rather it re ects the evolution of
a large brain with the ability to learn general
rules and to solve particular problems.
These hunting and gathering strategies pro-
duce a life history with dramatic dynamic
trade-offs. Figures 2A and 2B (adapted from
Kaplan et al., 2000) provide evidence of these
trade-offs for the Ache, Hiwi, and Hadza, also
providing a comparison to chimpanzees in the
wild.
An adolescent human male is a substantial
drain on society, but a mature hunter provides
suf cient calories to support several individu-
als. Since the lower female food productivity
curve can be attributed to raising children and to
other tasks such as food preparation, the male
curve is taken to represent total production of
either sex. This steeply rising male curve indi-
rectly re ects the biological formation of the
brain early in life, while directly re ecting the
learning-by-doing when hunting that this brain
allows. (There is a contribution here from in-
creasing physical strength, but this peaks more
than a decade before maximum productivity is
reached. Note also that the growth in male out-
put is not due to an increase in the number of
hours working, but to an increase in productiv-
ity per hour. See Kaplan et al., 2000.)
What is the evidence on the life expectancy
of our species? Figure 3 shows that hunter-
gatherers (the Ache) are subject to signi cantly
lower mortality than are chimpanzees in the
wild.4 It also shows that, although the mortality
curve for chimpanzees is V-shaped, the curve
for humans is more U-shaped. Human mortality
is relatively high during infancy, but falls
sharply until age 5 or so. There is then a long
period during which mortality at  rst slowly
falls and then slowly rises, followed  nally by a
sharp rise in old age after age 65 or so.5
Such patterns of mortality are often taken as
exogenous in biology.6 However, the present
paper can help answer two additional questions:
Why does mortality fall and then rise? Why is
human mortality more U-shaped than is chim-
panzee mortality?
4 This is adapted from Kaplan et al. (2000). Hill and Hurtado
(1996) analyze detailed data on the life course of the Ache.
5 The transformation of the chimpanzee mortality pro le
into that for humans is then an example of “rectangulariza-
tion,” as is discussed further in Section IV.
6 An exception is Mariusz Cichon (1997), who takes the
increase in the mortality rate to be determined by the
resources dedicated to this.
FIGURE 2A. MALE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
FIGURE 2B. FEMALE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
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Using both productivity and mortality data,
Figure 4 (adapted from Kaplan et al., 2001) is
an explicit representation of the huge intertem-
poral trade-off in hunter-gatherer life history.
This  gure plots cumulative net food transfers
weighted by the probability of survival as a
function of age, for both sexes in all hunter-
gatherer societies for which data exist. Inclusion
of the intergenerational transfer represented by
the female provision of child care would rein-
force the huge trade-off already evident here. It
takes until about age 50 to break even and the
ultimate excess is relatively small.
Figure 4 also vividly illustrates the essential
way in which intelligence and mortality are
intertwined. If this calculation is performed us-
ing human net transfers but chimpanzee mortal-
ity, the curve remains in substantial de cit,
which would imply a rapidly decreasing popu-
lation. Assuming that chimpanzee mortality ap-
proximates the mortality of human evolutionary
ancestors, this ancestral mortality could there-
fore not have supported the emergence of hu-
man intelligence and the associated economic
life history. The evolution of these human char-
acteristics then necessitated a substantial con-
current reduction in mortality.
Consider now two formal models of the co-
evolution of intelligence and life expectancy.
II. Model 1—General Somatic Capital
At each point in time, an individual has a
somatic capital stock, K . 0, producing a
stream of energy output, F(K). The initial cap-
ital stock is K(0) 5 K0 . 0. The production
function F satis es standard restrictions as
follows.
ASSUMPTION 1: F is such that F(0) 5 0;
F9(K) . 0 and F0(K) , 0, for all K . 0;
F9(K) # `, as K # 0 and F9(K) # 0, as
K # `.
The energy output can be used as investment,
v, then augmenting the capital stock according
to
dK
dt
5 v, where v [ [0, v#].7 The upper
bound on the investment rate, v# , represents a
simple type of increasing cost of investment, as
is compelling here.
Some of the energy output, s $ 0, can in-
stead be used to reduce the instantaneous mor-
tality rate, m(s), which is a decreasing convex
function of s, reaches a minimum level at some
s# , and is such that only interior solutions for s
typically arise.
ASSUMPTION 2: m is such that m9(s) , 0,
m0(s) . 0, for all s [ (0, s#); m(s) # m(0) ,
`, m9(s) # 2`, as s # 0; m9(s#) 5 0 and
m(s) 5 r . 0, for all s $ s# .8
7 Despite the empirical relevance of brain maintenance,
capital does not depreciate here, for simplicity. However,
the model can be easily modi ed to allow capital to depre-
ciate at a constant rate with little qualitative change in the
results.
8 If K represents brain mass, it seems plausible that m
should be independent of K. If K represents body size, m
should perhaps depend on K as well as s. In this case, it is
FIGURE 3. YEARLY MORTALITY
FIGURE 4. CUMULATIVE EXPECTED ENERGY SURPLUS BY
AGE: HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
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This mortality rate has a mathematical effect
similar to that of a time-varying interest rate. In
the same way that an overall discount factor for
time-varying interest is calculated, the overall
probability of survival to age t, p(t), say, sat-
is es
dp~t!
dt
5 2p~t!m~s! where p(0) 5 1.
The energy surplus  ow at age t is then y(t) 5
F(K(t)) 2 v(t) 2 s(t). Finally, it is assumed
that the initial production of each individual
costs C0 $ K0 . 0. The biologically appro-
priate objective criterion is the topic of the next
subsection.
Consider  rst how the theory here might be
reconciled with the observations in Section I,
subsection C. For this purpose, F(K) is identi-
 ed with observed production, v 1 s with
observed consumption, so that y is the observed
net transfer, as in Figures 2A, 2B, and 5.9
A. The Objective Criterion
By way of introducing the appropriate crite-
rion here, consider a species in which individ-
uals have probability p(t) of reaching age t,
when they produce expected offspring m(t) $
0. What steady-state rate of population growth,
r, say, does this allow? If the total birth rate is
Q(t) at time t, say, the birth rate at a time t 2
t must have been Q(t)e2 r t, given steady-state
growth. Hence the density of individuals of age
t at time t is p(t)Q(t)e2 r t and the contribution
of these individuals to the birth rate at time t is
m(t) p(t)Q(t)e2 r t. The steady-state growth
rate, r, is then the unique solution of the “Euler-
Lotka equation” 0
` e2 r tp(t)m(t) dt 5 1. (See
Stearns, 1992, for example. It also can be shown
that the age distribution generally converges to
the steady-state distribution from an arbitrary
initial con guration.) If there are a number of
types, any type with the maximal growth rate
will ultimately dominate other types with
lower rates, so the steady-state growth rate is
the appropriate criterion for biological suc-
cess.10 The Euler-Lotka equation focuses on
the biological reproduction of individuals as the
crucial characteristic that limits and determines
the growth rate.
However, this conventional biological ap-
proach ignores the crucial energetic constraints
on population growth. This seems especially an
issue for human beings, who invest heavily in
their young. The following economic approach,
where the resource  ows between generations
are the crucial limiting characteristic, is then
more appealing. Suppose individuals have a
probability of survival pro le p and a surplus
energy pro le y, where initial production of
each individual costs C0. What steady-state
growth rates, r, are then feasible? Reasoning
along similar lines as before, if the birth rate at
time t is Q(t), say, the net economic surplus
derived from y at time t is 0
` Q(t)e2r tp(t) y(t)
dt. Since energy expenditure on newborns is
Q(t)C0, a growth rate r is economically feasi-
ble if and only if 0
` e2 r tp(t) y(t) dt $ C0. The
problem then becomes that of  nding the max-
imum growth rate that is economically feasible
over choice of p and y that satisfy the con-
straints of the model.
Implicit in this approach is that individuals
who have energy de cits, typically the young,
have these de cits made up by the energy sur-
pluses of other, typically older, individuals. The
food-sharing in hunter-gatherer societies per-
forms such redistribution on a large scale, as
Figures 2A and 2B imply. In a snapshot of such
a society, there is an age distribution of individ-
uals, each with a characteristic energy surplus
or de cit. Since there is essentially no storage of
food, instantaneous feasibility dictates that
these surpluses must be nonnegative in the
aggregate.
From the lifetime point of view of an indi-
vidual in such a society, this redistribution func-
tions as a loan. That is, in exchange for a
subsidy while young, the individual makes re-
payments while older. What compels older in-
dividuals to repay the loan they were given
while young? The answer is that individuals
have a biological motive to foster their own
offspring. Indeed, natural selection would actclear that mortality will tend to fall during the initial growth
phase. (Richard Sibly et al., 1985, present such a model.) In
any case, the present model shows that the initially increas-
ing value of an individual suf ces for this result.
9 The cost C0 is interpreted as the metabolic transfer
from mother to the unborn infant, which is small compared
to the transfers from parents to children.
10 Such a growth rate criterion would determine biolog-
ical success in the absence of overall resource constraints. If
these were modeled explicitly, greater attention would need
to be paid to the interactions within and across species.
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on genes in uencing resource transfers between
generations. Genes maximizing their repre-
sentation in future generations would be those
generating such parental concern. The social
food-sharing arrangements of hunter-gatherer
societies smooth out this intergenerational
transfer and are presumably Pareto improving,
but they do not change its basically sel sh
nature.11
To illustrate the distinctness of the present
approach, note that it recognizes that humans
have economic value, and therefore biological
value, after the age when their own reproduc-
tion ceases. From the point of view of the Euler-
Lotka equation, it is mysterious why individuals
should even live beyond this age; from the
present economic point of view, the biological
purpose of this is clear: It is to provide resources
to offspring.
Although the growth rate criterion is unusual
in economics, it is straightforward and conve-
nient to transform it into a typical economic
one, as follows:
LEMMA 1: If p and y generate the maximum
growth rate r# [ (2`, `), then p and y max-
imize 0
` e2 r# tp(t) y(t) dt at the value C0.
12
PROOF:
For example, if p and y generate r# , but
0
` e2 r# tp(t) y(t) dt . C0, then 0
` e2r tp(t) y(t)
dt . C0 for some r. r# , and a rate greater than
r# is possible.
Further, since the actual growth rate of homi-
nids over the last two million years must have
been essentially zero, it is assumed that r# 5 0.
Lemma 1 then motivates considering the max-
imization of total expected energy surplus
0
` p(t) y(t) dt subject to the above model.13
Theorem 1 below ultimately rigorously justi es
this approach by proving that this transformed
problem has a unique solution, and, as long as
0
` p(t) y(t) dt 5 C0, that this solution also
generates the maximum growth rate of zero.14
B. A Key Steady State
As the  rst step to solving the problem of
maximizing total expected energy surplus, con-
sider states in which capital is  xed at K, so
investment v is zero, and where expenditure on
mortality reduction, s, is also constant. Take
then the optimal such s and so de ne
(1) W~K! 5 max
s$0
Z~K, s!,
where Z~K, s! ;
F~K! 2 s
m~s!
.
That is, since the constant  ow of energy sur-
plus in such a steady state is y 5 F(K) 2 s and
the constant mortality rate m(s) has the same
mathematical effect as a constant interest rate,
Z(K, s) is total expected energy surplus in such
a steady state.
LEMMA 2: Given Assumptions 1 and 2, a
unique optimal s in (1) exists for all K . 0,
given by s(K) [ (0, F(K)), say, the unique solution
of Zs(K, s) 5 0. Furthermore,
ds~K!
dK
. 0. Hence
11Another major function of food sharing in hunter-
gatherer societies is to spread risk, since, for example, the
return from hunting large game is highly variable. (See
Kaplan and Hill, 1985, for example.)
12Although r# is an unknown parameter, it turns out to be
suf cient in general to solve this transformed problem.
Observe also that r# functions as a source of impatience. An
additional source is that, whereas energy in youth favors
one’s own reproduction, that in old age bene ts the repro-
duction only of one’s offspring, who are only 12 relatives
under sexual reproduction. Alan Rogers (1994) derives the
rate of time preference from such considerations, which are
neglected here, for simplicity.
13Although the average growth rate must have been close
to zero, there might still have been periods of positive growth
interrupted by occasional crashes. As long as the crashes were
selectively neutral, the appropriate growth rate might then be
positive. This makes little qualitative difference to the results,
however, since a positive growth rate could be incorporated
into the de nition of the mortality rate.
In terms of Oded Galor and David N. Weil (2000), the
regime here is “Malthusian.” The effect here that an envi-
ronment promoting learning induces a larger brain is for-
mally reminiscent of their effect that technological change
spurs education, in the “Modern Growth Regime.” Galor
and Weil, however, do not allow endogenousmortality. See
also Galor and Omer Moav (2002).
14 Total offspring is also maximized, at the value 1, by
choice of the optimal pro les p and y. Such biological
maximization problems, that also specify the maximized
value, are reminiscent of perfect competition, where  rms
maximize pro ts, and pro ts are zero.
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higher gross output, F (K), implies higher opti-
mal expenditure on mortality reduction.
PROOF:
The proofs of this and all the subsequent
Lemmas and Theorems are in the Appendix.
It follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that
limK# 0W9(K) 5 ` and that limK# `W9(K) 5
0. For technical convenience, it is further as-
sumed that:
ASSUMPTION 3: There exists a unique K* .
0 such that W9(K*) 5 1 and W0(K*) , 0.15
The condition W9(K*) 5 1 characterizes an
optimal steady state. [The marginal cost of in-
creasing the capital stock is 1, since this must be
obtained by sacri cing current energy output,
whereas the marginal gain is W9(K).] That is, it
will be shown that the steady state with capital
K* and the associated s(K*) 5 s*, say, de-
scribes long-run behavior in any optimal life
history.
C. The Optimal Life History
Suppose  rst that K0 $ K*, where K* sat-
is esW9(K*) 5 1. This implies thatW9(K0) #
1, so the return from an increment in capital is
less than its cost in terms of forgone output
now. Set then v(t) [ 0, and s(t) [ s(K0). If
K0 , K*, instead, invest so as to converge as
fast as possible to the steady state with capital
K* and expenditure on mortality reduction s*.
De ne then t* 5 (K* 2 K0)/v# , and take the
investment path as
v~t! 5 5 v# , for t , t*0, for t $ t* .
The candidate path of mortality reduction
expenditure for K0 , K* can be motivated as
follows. Suppose that the total expected future
energy surplus, or the “value of a life,” at age t,
is J(t) 5 ( p(t))21 t
` p(t) y(t) dt. Hence the
value of a life evolves as
dJ
dt
5 2y 1
Jm~s!. Given J, the optimal expenditure on
mortality reduction, s, is determined by
2Jm9(s) 5 1. That is, the  ow of gain from an
increment in s should equal its cost  ow, 1.
Altogether, then:
(2)
dJ
dt
5 2F~K! 1 v 1 s 1 Jm~s!
where 2Jm9~s! 5 1.
This problem is now shown to have a unique
solution. It is convenient to establish two of its
properties at the same time.
LEMMA 3: The problem (2) has a unique
solution for s, where
ds
dt
. 0, and s . s(K),
for all t [ [0, t*).
Thus the candidate path for expenditure on mor-
tality reduction, s, over the initial phase is
strictly increasing and s is always greater than
the level that would be optimal if investment
were to cease immediately.
These observations illuminate typical bio-
logical patterns of initial mortality. That is,
expenditure on mortality reduction is gov-
erned by the value of life, J. This is initially
increasing, and mortality is falling, because
somatic investment is occurring. Similarly,
it is plausible that mortality expenditure
should be increased by the anticipation of the
higher somatic capital stocks that will be
accumulated.
Equation (2) is Bellman’s equation. Although
this is a necessary condition for optimality only
under undesirably strong assumptions, it is suf-
 cient in a satisfactory sense:
THEOREM 1: (a) The functions v(t) and s(t)
described above imply time paths for K (t) and
p(t) which maximize 0
` p(t) y(t) dt over the set
of feasible absolutely continuous paths. This
solution is essentially unique. (b) If C0 5
0
` p(t) y(t) dt for this solution, then this solu-
15Note that W0~K! 5
F9~K!2
m~s~K!!
F0~K!
F9~K!2
2
~m9~s~K!!!3
m0~s~K!!
. A condition on the mortality function that is
suf cient for the global concavity ofW , for a given concave
F, is that 2
m9~s!3
m0~s!
# U, for all s [ [0, s#], where U .
0 is small enough. There are functions satisfying Assump-
tion 2 and this requirement.
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tion also maximizes the associated growth rate,
as in Section II, subsection A, and this maxi-
mum growth rate is zero.
This  rst result extends standard economic
growth theory by allowing an endogenously
chosen mortality (or interest) rate. Despite this,
the optimal path converges to a steady state in a
familiar way. The second result is that this
solution to the problem of maximizing total
expected energy surplus also provides the solu-
tion to the basic biological problem of maxi-
mizing the growth rate.
D. More Productive Capital;
Lower Extrinsic Mortality
How does a parametric decrease in mortality
or a parametric increase in production affect the
choices of s and K as functions of time? Intro-
duce a parameter a into the production function
such that an increase in a means that output
rises and the marginal product of capital does
not fall. Suppose also that mortality has an
“extrinsic” component given by b, where m is
now considered “intrinsic mortality.”16
ASSUMPTION 4: (a) The production function
is now F(K, a), for a [ A, where A is a
compact interval, such that (i) F( z , a) satis es
Assumption 1 for each a [ A, (ii) Fa (K, a) .
0 and FKa (K, a) $ 0, for all a [ A and K .
0. (b) The mortality function is now m(s) 1 b,
where b [ B, for B a compact interval, and m
satis es Assumption 2.
Consider  rst a change in the parameter a to
re ect greater productivity. Denote the entire
time path of s as s(t, a).
THEOREM 2(a): In Model 1, with these pa-
rameters added,
­s~t, a!
­a
. 0, for all t $ 0,
and
dK*
da
. 0.
In particular, even if productivity increases
across the board, so that the marginal product of
capital is not affected, long-run mortality falls.
The reason is that such a productivity increase
raises the value of life. This decrease in long-
run mortality then causes the long-run level of
capital to rise. These effects are only strength-
ened if the marginal product of capital is in-
creased by the productivity increase. Indeed,
such an increase in productivity reduces mor-
tality at every age.
Consider now changing the parameter b that
represents extrinsic mortality.17 Denote the en-
tire time path of s as s(t, b).
THEOREM 2(b): In Model 1,
­s~t, b!
­b
, 0,
for all t $ 0, and
dK*
db
, 0.
That is: A decrease in extrinsic mortality, b,
leads to a further amplifying decrease in intrin-
sic long-run mortality, m(s*). Although such a
result might seem at  rst contrary to economic
intuition, it follows here just because such a fall
in b must increase the value of life at each age.
The reduction in overall mortality leads to an
increase in long-run capital, K*. Indeed, a re-
duction in extrinsic mortality causes a reinforc-
ing reduction in intrinsic mortality at every age.
These comparative static results for Model 1
are further discussed in Section III, subsection
B, together with the related results for Model 2.
III. Model 2—Speci c Neural Capital
Especially when the somatic capital in
Model 1 is interpreted as the brain, this model
does not account for key features of the lifetime
production pro les in Figures 2A and 2B and
the mortality pro les in Figure 3. First, it does
not generate the steep rise in output evident
during adulthood among men. Growth in phys-
ical strength is initially a factor here, but, since
this peaks at about age 22, the subsequent rise in
output seems to be due to learning-by-doing.
16 The additively separable form for mortality can be
relaxed to allow a function of the form m(s, b), where
m( z , b) satis es Assumption 2, mb(s, b) . 0 and msb (s,
b) $ 0.
17 Either an increase in a or a decrease in b by itself
implies that positive population growth would occur. Zero
growth should be reestablished. Although this could be
done in general via density dependence of the production or
mortality functions, it is assumed here that this is done by
increasing C0.
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This delayed growth in productivity implies that
investment in neural capital induces a signi -
cant dynamic trade-off after physical growth of
the brain is complete. Indeed, this consideration
distinguishes the brain from most other forms of
somatic capital.18 Secondly, Model 1 does not
account for the declining output and rising mor-
tality most evident beyond age 65 or so.
Model 2, in which output varies over time
with a constant stock, addresses these issues and
permits the focus to be speci cally on neural
capital. If now the brain has  xed size K, pro-
duction at date t is F(K, t), say. There is an
initial range over which F(K, t) rises. One
factor that would tend to induce this rise is con-
tinuing overall bodily growth, where F(K, t) is
interpreted as output less investment in other non-
neural somatic stocks.19 However, the key factor
leading to rising productivity, even after all so-
matic investment is complete, is learning-by-
doing. Thus a large brain, K, induces high levels
of F(K, t), which only become evident at ages, t,
long after brain growth itself has ended. Finally,
senescence is captured in a terminal range of ages
over which F(K, t) declines.
ASSUMPTION 5: (a) (i) There is some T . 0
and, for each K . 0, some tˆ(K), where T .
tˆ(K) . 0, such that F(K, 0) 5 0; Ft(K, t) .
0, for all t [ [0, tˆ(K)); Ft(K, tˆ(K)) 5 0 and
Ftt(K, tˆ(K)) , 0; Ft(K, t) , 0, for all t [
( tˆ(K), T]; and F(K, t) 5 0, for all t $ T.20 (ii)
F( z , t) satis es Assumption 1, for each t [ (0,
T). (b) Mortality m satis es Assumption 2.21
For analytic simplicity, neural investment
dK
dt
5
v, is now constrained to occur in a block of
time at the beginning of life.22 That is, for some
t $ 0,
v~t! 5 5 v# . 0 t [ @0, t!0 t $ t .
There is again an initial cost C0 $ K0 . 0 for
each individual.
Lemma 1 remains valid, so that any end
date for investment, t, and any mortality re-
duction expenditure pro le, s, that maximize
the steady-state growth rate, also maximize
total expected energy surplus, discounted us-
ing this growth rate. Assuming again that this
maximum growth rate is zero, Model 2 then
suggests considering the following “overall
problem:”
(3) max
t [ @0,T#
M~t!,
for M~t! 5 max
s #
0
t
p~t!~F~K0 1 v#t, t!
2 s~t! 2 v# ! dt 1 p~t!W~K0 1 v# t, t! ,
(4) where W~K, t! ; max
s
~p~t!!21
3 X #
t
T
p~t!~F~K, t! 2 s~t!! dtD ,
for all K . 0, and p(t) 5 exp 2 0
t m(s(t))
dt, for all t [ [0, T]. Theorem 3 rigorously
justi es this approach by showing that this over-
all problem has a unique solution and, given the
maximum total expected energy surplus equals
C0, that this solution attains the maximum
growth rate of zero.
18 Some such lag between the end of direct investment
and the peak of output might arise with other kinds of
somatic capital, if investment in one kind should precede
investment in another. For example, perhaps bones should
be fully formed before muscular growth and development
can be completed. The magnitude of this lag might only be
several years, however, contrasting with the 25–30 years
between the end of direct neural investment and the peak
output it permits.
19 In general, F(K, t) could be negative initially, as long
as M(0) remains nonnegative, where M(t) is introduced
below.
20 For simplicity, T is independent of K.
21 It might be realistic for m to be time dependent,
tending to rise at the end of life. It is not necessary
to assume this, however, to generate eventually rising
mortality.
22 This assumption seems biologically realistic. How-
ever, if the production function yields low enough output for
a long enough time initially, but then rises rapidly, unconstrained
optimal investment involves delay. On the other hand, there are
production functions for which the optimal investment path
involves a block of maximal investment initially, as assumed
here.
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A. The Optimal Life History—
U-Shaped Mortality
Address  rst the subproblem of maximiz-
ing total expected energy surplus W(K, t)
conditional on an arbitrary starting date, t,
and an arbitrary constant capital stock, K .
0. This subproblem generalizes that of the
optimal steady state in Model 1 and the as-
sumptions made here generalize those made
there. Consider the following equations for s
and J:
(5) Jm9~s! 5 21,
dJ
dt
5 2y 1 Jm~s!,
for all t [ @0, T#, and J~T! 5 0,
where y(t) 5 F(K, t) 2 s(t). It follows that:
LEMMA 4: There is a unique solution for s of
(5), and this is the essentially unique optimal
path. It follows from (4) that WK(K, t) 5
( p(t))21( t
T p(t)FK(K, t) dt) . 0, for all t [
[0, T) and from (3) that
dM~t!
dt
5 p~t!~WK
~K0 1 v#t, t! 2 1)v#, for all t [ [0, T].
Assumption 5 and equation (4) imply that
limK# 0WK(K, t) 5 `, for all t [ [0, T ), and
that WK(K, T) 5 0, for all K . 0. Hence
dM~T!
dt
, 0; whereas, if K(0) is small enough,
dM~0!
dt
. 0. Hence M(t) has a maximum at
some t* [ (0, T) where
dM~t*!
dt
5 0 and
d2M~t*!
dt2
# 0. This is sharpened slightly, in the
usual way, as follows:
ASSUMPTION 6: There is a unique t* [ (0,
T ) maximizing M(t) over [0, T ], such that
dM~t*!
dt
5 0 and
d2M~t*!
dt2
5 p(t*)(WKK(K0 1
v# t*, t*)v# 1 WKt(K0 1 v# t*, t*)) , 0.
Model 2 is now shown to provide an eco-
nomic explanation for the typical U-shape of
mortality rates. This follows because the present
assumptions imply that the value of life is
hump-shaped, and the value of life and mortal-
ity are closely linked. To be precise: As long as
output continues to rise after t*, the associated
optimal mortality pro le must be U-shaped. In
addition, this solution of the overall problem, as
in (3), maximizes the growth rate at zero:
THEOREM 3: (a) There is an essentially
unique optimal path s yielding M(t*) . 0.
Given that optimal neural investment ends be-
fore output peaks, so that 0 , t* , tˆ(K*) 5 tˆ,
say, there is some t# [ (0, tˆ) such that the
optimal m is continuous, strictly decreasing for
t [ [0, t#), and strictly increasing for t [ (t#,
T ). (b) If C0 5 M(t*), this solution for s
generates the maximum growth rate, as in Sec-
tion II, subsection A, and this maximum growth
rate is zero.
A nice empirical test of the present approach
is then provided by the predicted inverse rela-
tionship between J(t) and m(s), which stems
from how mortality is determined here—from
the relation Jm9(s) 5 21. Consider Figure 5,
using data for both sexes on production, con-
sumption, and mortality for the Ache, Hiwi, and
Hadza.23
Although the present speci cation of the
mortality function is mainly for simplicity, and
Figure 5 suggests it is not exactly valid, it also
suggests it is a good approximation.
B. An Environment Favoring Learning;
Lower Extrinsic Mortality
Consider now an economic environment in
which learning is more effective, as modeled by
a shift in a parameter a in the production func-
tion. With an increase in a, output after brain
growth is complete may at  rst decline, upon
the advent of a cognitively demanding forag-
ing activity. For example, a teenage male who
hunts may accept lower current output than that
from alternative productive activities. At older
ages, however, output rises substantially.24 It is
23Although the present model treats other nonneural
somatic investment as a reduction in output rather than as a
component of consumption, energy  ow surplus is not af-
fected by this transfer.
24 It is enough that output may at  rst be lower and then
must be higher, regardless of how this pattern relates to t*.
The present assumption is realistic, however, because there
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indeed only the ultimate rise in the productivity
of hunting resulting from learning-by-doing that
makes such early specialization in hunting op-
timal. It is also then assumed that the overall
effect of the increase in a is either to raise or
hold constant total expected energy surplus.25
As an alternative to such a shift in productivity,
we will consider also the effect of a parametric
reduction in extrinsic mortality.26
ASSUMPTION 7: (a) The production function
F(K, t, a) satis es Assumption 5, for each a [
A, where A is a compact interval. It also
satis es FKa (K, t, a) $ 0, for all K $ 0, t [
[0, T ] and a [ A. In addition, there exists t† [
[t*, T ) such that (i) Fa(K*, t, a) 5 0, for all
t [ [0, t*]; (ii) Fa(K*, t, a) , 0, for all t [
(t*, t†); (iii) Fa (K*, t, a) . 0, for t [ (t†, T];
and (iv) t*
T p(t)Fa (K*, t, a) dt $ 0. (b)
Mortality is m 1 b, where m satis es
Assumption 2, and b [ B, where B is a com-
pact interval.
An environment that favors learning in this
sense induces simultaneous increases in life ex-
pectancy and brain size, despite the substantial
lag that may now exist between the time that
brain growth is complete and the peak favorable
productivity shift. Lower extrinsic mortality has
similar effects:
THEOREM 4: The following comparative
static results now hold. (a)
­s~t, a!
­a
$ 0, for
all t [ @0, t*#,
­s~t, a!
­a
. 0, for all t [ (t*,
T), and
dK*
da
. 0. Thus, a shift to an environ-
ment favoring learning leads to greater life
expectancy and to increased neural capital. (b)
­s~t, b!
­b
, 0, for all t [ [0, T ), and
dK*
db
,
0, so that lower extrinsic mortality also induces
greater life expectancy and increased neural
capital.
The comparative static results for Model 1
and, especially, Model 2 imply that human in-
telligence and life expectancy might have co-
evolved as follows. A drier climate several
million years ago resulted in the expansion of
the African savanna at the expense of the rain-
forest. The resulting ecology sustained more
grasses and hence more herbivores, as well as
plants with edible roots and nut-bearing trees.
The availability of these skill-intensive, high-
energy food resources raised the productivity of
the brain. This might have been true to a small
extent in the immediate sense of Model 1, but
seems especially plausible in the delayed sense
of Model 2. In either case, this shift induced
greater expenditure on mortality reduction, so
that both life expectancy and intelligence rose.
In addition, the skill, weapons, and social orga-
nization required for hunting seems bound to
have simultaneously reduced extrinsic mortality
in the form of predation on humans.27 As in
either model, this led to an amplifying decrease
is little output before brain growth is complete, and it
slightly simpli es matters.
25 The effect of an increase in a by itself is then to
increase the maximal growth rate above zero or to hold it
constant at zero. See Kaplan and Robson (2002).
Note also that such a shift might have a roughly neutral
effect on overall body size, helping explain why this went
up only slightly over the last two million years.
26Again, the effect of a decrease in b or an increase in
a is offset here by a change in C0 that restores zero growth.
27 These same qualities might also have led to an in-
crease in mortality due to warfare. However, the reduction
in mortality due to predation might well have been impor-
tant at low population densities, whereas the increase in
mortality due to warfare might only have become important
at higher densities, where it served to limit ultimate growth.
FIGURE 5. FORAGER MORTALITY AND ENERGY SURPLUS
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in intrinsic mortality, and the reduced overall
mortality induced an increase in intelligence.
These two effects—from increasing productiv-
ity and from reducing extrinsic mortality—
therefore reinforced one another.
C. “Rectangularization” of Mortality
The speci cation of mortality here predicts a
distinction between human and chimpanzee
mortality patterns that stems from the econom-
ics of the two species. In either model, mortality
is determined by the relation Jm9(s) 5 21, but
we focus here on Model 2, in which J is more
 exibly determined. Suppose humans and chim-
panzees have the same mortality function, m,
and experience the same mortality rate, m(s),
perhaps at two different ages during childhood.28
The valuesof J and s then also coincide.However,
since
dJ
dt
5 2y 1 m~s!J . 0, where y(t) 5
F(K(t), t, a) 2 s(t), it follows that mortality
m(s) will fall faster in human beings, given they
have larger energy de cit, 2y, in this compar-
ison. In addition, since the maximum value of a
human life is higher, minimummortality will be
lower. Figure 3 bears out these predictions.29
Model 2 similarly predicts that mortality
should rise faster for humans than for chimpan-
zees if human energy surplus  ow is the higher
of the two when older individuals of the two
species with the same mortality rate are com-
pared. Although Figure 3 seems to suggest
that mortality rises faster for humans in this
sense, it should be noted that there are a
limited number of individuals of such ages in
the data set.
More generally, m might also depend on
overall body size and so be a time dependent
function of s. Nevertheless, one factor tending
to make human mortality rates fall rapidly in
youth, attain a low minimum, and rise rapidly in
old age may be the economic one described
here.
IV. Discussion
Although the two models here investigate
how natural selection modi ed genes in uenc-
ing intelligence and life expectancy, they can be
reinterpreted as more conventional economic
decision-making. For example, consider how
individuals simultaneously decide to reduce
mortality rates via medical treatment, for exam-
ple, and to invest in human capital. Model 1
might then imply, for example, that moderniza-
tion of health care or greater productivity of
education would result in both greater invest-
ment in human capital and greater expenditures
on health.30 Further, Model 2 provides an alter-
native explanation for “rectangularization” of
mortality rates, as is sometimes claimed to be an
ongoing trend in modern human demography.
The usual explanationoffered is that a reduction
in mortality from infectious disease exposes a
process of senescence that sets a biological
maximum life span. (See, for example, Kenneth
G. Manton et al., 1991.) However, moderniza-
tion presumably also involves greater invest-
ment in youth and a greater  ow of returns from
mature adults. This increases the rate at which
the value of life increases during youth and the
maximum value that it reaches. It might also
increase the rate at which it eventually de-
creases. Reinterpreting the second model as one
of endogenous health care, mortality rates
would then fall faster during youth, and reach
lower values during adolescence and early
adulthood, but possibly rise faster during old
age, as required.
There are less immediate but perhaps more
interesting implications of the present ap-
proach for the genetic shaping of preferences
in hunter-gatherer societies. Hunter-gatherer
age pro les of production could not have
evolved without intergenerational resource
 ows. Without credit markets, such down-
ward  ows would not arise in a standard
economic setting with sel shly rational bor-
rowing and lending. An evolutionary model
like those here implies that the  ow of re-
sources from old to young should be inter-
preted instead as maximizing a dynastic
28 The underlying reason for the difference between the
two species is then a shift in productivity, not a shift in
exogenous mortality.
29 The model also predicts that the initial infant mortality
level for humans should be lower than for chimpanzees, if
the overall value of a human life is larger, as is consistent
with Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
30 This is then an alternative approach to that of Isaac
Ehrlich and Hiroyuki Chuma (1990), for example.
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utility function that measures the growth rate
of a genetic lineage.
These huge intergenerational  ows mean
standard biological approaches may not be ap-
propriate either. One such standard biological
approach involves “reproductive value,” for ex-
ample. This is the sum of the probabilities of
being alive at each age multiplied by the ex-
pected number of offspring produced at that
age, all discounted at the rate of population
growth. Humans in their  fties and older then
have negligible reproductive value. It is then
unclear why they would even survive to such
ages, if there were any possibility of raising
fertility by even a small amount at younger
ages, while decreasing survival later. Reproduc-
tive value cannot then readily account for the
evolutionary formation of preferences across
the entire life span.31
The present approach views children as in-
vestments within the parents’ genetic lineage.
During childhood and adolescence, children
need parental subsidy. As parents approach
middle age, the total burden on them increases,
since there are more dependent children. A
change in wealth should then be considered to
affect the survival and reproduction of this in-
creasing number of children, and it is not puz-
zling why humans survive into their  fties and
beyond. This yields a new framework for ex-
amining how time preference and risk aversion
vary with age, which might be especially illu-
minating for middle and old age. It has the
potential to explain patterns of age variation of
these economic attributes that may seem anom-
alous for an individual concerned only with
herself.
In particular, such an evolutionary approach
could provide a solid underpinning for the ap-
proach of Philip A. Trostel and Grant A. Taylor
(2001). They propose that discounting arises
because mental and physical capacities decline
with age, because this deterioration reduces the
marginal utility of consumption. Further, they
propose that the rate of time discount might
increase over the life cycle. An evolutionary
approach would provide a more fundamental
perspective on this. That is, if marginal utility
declines with age, it could address why this
would be evolutionarily optimal.
Finally, Models 1 and 2 sharpen the question
of why aging occurs at all. Model 1 shows that,
assuming that production and mortality are
time-invariant functions, an optimal life history
will consist of an investment period during
which capital grows and endogenous mortal-
ity falls and then a steady state in which capi-
tal and mortality remain at constant optimal
levels. Capital depreciation does not lead to
a qualitative change in this conclusion.
Model 2 shows that if aging is simply as-
sumed to decrease productive output, mortal-
ity will ultimately increase with age. At the
present, however, there is not a deep under-
standing of why capital should be allowed to
age, whether this concerns machines or biolog-
ical organisms. Deeper explanations of aging
would be of considerable interest in both biol-
ogy and economics.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
If K . 0, Zs ~K, s! 5 2
1
m~s!
2
~F~K! 2 s!m9~s!
m~s!2
, and Zs 5 0 implies s [ (0,
F(K)) . Moreover, if Zs(K, s) 5 0, then
Z ss ~K, s! 5 2
~F~K! 2 s!m0~s!
m~s!2
, 0. There
is then a unique maximizer s(K) [ (0, F(K)) ,
such that Zss(K, s(K)) , 0; Zs(K, s) . 0 for
all s , s(K) and Zs(K, s) , 0 for all s . s(K).
Since Z sK 5 2
F9~K!
m~s!2
m9~s! . 0, it follows
that
ds~K!
dK
5 2
ZsK
Zss
. 0.
Remark: SinceW 0~K! 5
F 0m0~F2 s!1 F9~m9!2
mm0~F2 s!
,
the condition W0(K*) , 0 is equivalent to
31Rogers (1994) adopts an approach based on reproduc-
tive value. However, he allows a given female, for example,
to contemplate transfers to a sequence of descendants—
daughter, granddaughter, and so on. This explicitly involves
the female being of reproductive age. However, the se-
quence of weights obtained like this seem to be appropriate
relative weights for a female beyond reproductive age con-
templating a transfer away from her daughter in favor of her
granddaughter, for example.
164 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2003
(A1) D 5 F0m0~F 2 s!
1 F9~m9!2 , 0, at K*, s*.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
Eliminating J from (2) yields the candidate
path of mortality expenditure, s, as the contin-
uous solution of:
(A2)
ds
dt
5 f ~s, t! 5 2
~m9~s!!2
m0~s!
3 X F~K0 1 v# t! 2 v# 2 s 1 m~s!m9~s!D ,
for all t , t*;
and s(t) 5 s*, for all t $ t*. De ne w~s, t! 5
F~K0 1 v# t! 2 s 1
m~s!
m9~s!
, for all (s, t) [
S [ (0, s#) 3 [0, t*]. It follows that
dw~s~t!, t!
dt
5 F9v# 2
mm0
~m9!2
ds
dt
5 F9v# 2
m(v# 2 w). In particular, if 0 , K , K* and
w 5 0, so that s 5 s(K), then
(A3)
dw
dt
5 ~F9 2 m!v# . 0.
Furthermore,
d 2w~s~t!, t!
dt2
5 F 0v# 2 2 m9
ds
dt
(v# 2
w) 1 m
dw
dt
. Hence at t*, where K 5 K* and
s 5 s*,
(A4)
dw2
dt
5 w 5 0,
so
d2w2
dt2
5 X F0 2 ~m9!3m0 D v# 2 , 0, using (A1).
There is a unique solution for s of (A2) in some
neighborhood of (s*, t*). Further, (A3) and
(A4) imply this extends to a unique solution for
all t [ [0, t*], that stays in the region where
w , 0 and s [ (0, s*). Hence
ds
dt
. 0, for all
t [ [0, t*]. Finally, if (s, t) [ S, then
Z s ~K, s! 5 2
m9
m2 X F~K! 2 s 1 mm9D 5
2
m9
m2
w. Hence (s, t) [ S and w , 0 imply
Zs(K, s) , 0 so that s . s(K) . 0.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1(a):
If the candidate path is given by v, s, K, and
p, de ne V(K0) 5 0
` p(F(K) 2 v 2 s) dt,
where K(0) 5 K0 . 0 and p(0) 5 1. Since
V(K0) 5 W(K0), for all K0 $ K*
(A5) 0 5 2F~K0 ! 1 s 1 m~s!V~K0 !.
For any 0 , K0 , K* and any d [ (0, t*),
V(K0) 5 0
d p(F(K0 1 v# t) 2 v# 2 s) dt 1
exp(2 0
d m(s) dt)V(K0 1 v# d) , since the
value for initial capital stock, K9 , and initial
probability of survival, p, is pV(K9). It fol-
lows that
(A6) V9~K0 !v# 5 2F~K0 ! 1 v#
1 s 1 m~s!V~K0 ! .
It is now shown that, for all vˆ [ [0, v#] and all
sˆ $ 0,
(A7) F~K! 2 vˆ 2 sˆ
1 V9~K!vˆ 2 V~K!m~sˆ! # 0,
for all K . 0. This inequality (A7), together
with (A5) and (A6), is Bellman’s equation, and
it follows because:
(i) The control s satis es m9(s)V(K) 5 21,
so that V(K) . 0, for all K . 0.
(ii) Since V(K) 5 W(K), for all K . K*, and
W9(K) , 1, if K . K*, v 5 0 maximizes
the left-hand side (LHS) of (A7) there.
Since V9(K*) 5 1, v 5 0 is also maximal
here. All that remains is to show that v 5 v#
is maximal for all t , t*, which follows if
V9(K) . 1, for all 0 , K , K*.
PROOF OF (i):
If K $ K*, then m9~s!V~K! 5
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m9~s~K!!
F~K! 2 s~K!
m~S~K!!
5 21. If 0 , K(t) ,
K*, de ne l~t! 5 V~K~t!! 1
1
m9~s~t!!
, so
that
dl
dt
5 V9~K!v# 2
m0
~m9!2
ds
dt
5 ml, for all
0 # t , t*, using (A2) and (A6). However,
l~t*! 5 W~K*! 1
1
m9~s*!
5 0, so that
l(t) [ 0, for all 0 # t , t*.
PROOF OF (ii):
If 0 , K , K*, it follows that (V9(K)
2 1)v# 5 2F(K) 1 s 1 m(s)V(K) 5 2w(t).
Lemma 3 shows w(t) , 0, for all 0 # t , t*,
so that V9(K) . 1, for all 0 , K , K*.
Suppose now that K˜ and p˜ is any feasible
absolutely continuous path such that
dK˜
dt
5 v˜
and
dp˜
dt
5 2p˜m~s˜!, almost always, where v˜ [
[0, v#] and s˜ [ [0, s#] are measurable functions
of time. Using (A7), 0
T p˜(F(K˜) 2 v˜ 2 s˜)dt 1
0
T
d
dt
( p˜V(K˜)) dt # 0, so that, since V(K) . 0,
for all K . 0, V(K0) . 0
T p˜(F(K˜) 2 v˜ 2 s˜) dt,
for all T . 0. Hence V(K0) is the optimal value
function and the candidate path is optimal. This
argument also shows that any path which fails
to maximize the LHS of (A7) on a set of times
of positive measure cannot be optimal.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1(b):
The above proof indeed shows maxp,y
0
` e2 r tp(t) y(t) dt [ V(K0, r) exists, for all
r . 2r, since m could then be rede ned to
include r. By the envelope theorem,
­V
­r
5
2 0
` te2rtp~t! y~t! dt, for the optimal p and
y.32 Since
d
dt
@t t
` e2rtp~t! y~t! dt# 5
t
` e2rtp~t! y~t! dt 2 te2rtp~t! y~t!, integra-
tion by parts implies 0
` te2r tp(t) y(t) dt 5
0
` ( t
` e2 rtp(t) y(t) dt) dt . 0, because
t
` e2rtp(t) y(t) dt . 0, for all t $ 0, since
V(K0, r) . 0. Given V(K0, 0) 5 C0, then
V(K0, r) , C0, for all r . 0. Thus a growth
rate of zero is possible, but any strictly positive
growth rate is not.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2(a):
Let J(t, a) 5 V(K0 1 v# t, a), for all t [ [0,
t*(a)) and J(t, a) 5 W(K*(a), a), for all
t $ t*(a). By the envelope theorem, Ja(t,
a) 5 ( p(t))21( t
t* p(t)Fa(K(t), a) dt 1
p(t*)Wa(K*, a)) . 0, for all t [ [0, t*).
From WK(K*, a) 5 1, it follows that
dK*
da
5 2
WKa ~K*, a!
WKK ~K*, a!
. 0 and
dt*
da
.
0, since WKa ~K, a! 5
FKa ~K, a!
m~s~K!!
2
Fa~K,a!m9~s~K!!
m~s~K!!2
ds~K!
dK
. 0. Also Ja~t,a! 5
WK ~K*, a!
dK*
da
1 Wa ~K*, a! . 0, for all
t . t*. Since m9(s(t, a))J(t, a) 5 21, it
follows that
­s~t, a!
­a
. 0, for all t $ 0.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2(b):
Let J(t, b) be de ned similarly. Using the
envelope theorem, Jb ~t, b! 5 t
`
­
­b
p~t!
p~t!
3 ~F~K~t!, t! 2 s~t! 2 v~t!! dt 5
2 t
`
p~t!
p~t!
~t 2 t!~F~K~t!, t! 2 s~t! 2
v~t!!dt, for all t [ [0, t*). Integration by parts
implies Jb (t, b) 5 2(p(t))
21
t
` p(t)J(t, b)
dt , 0, for all t [ [0, t*), since J(t, b) . 0,
for all t $ 0. From WK(K*, b) 5 1, it fol-
lows that
dK*
db
5 2
WKb ~K*, b!
WKK ~K*, b!
, 0,
and
dt*
db
, 0, since WKb ~K, b! 5
2
F9~K! 1 ds~K!/dK
~m~s~K!! 1 b!2
, 0. Also Jb (t, b) 5
WK(K*, b)
dK*
db
1 Wb ~K*, b! , 0, for all
t . t*. From m9(s(t, b))J(t, b) 5 21, it
follows that
­s~t, b!
­b
, 0, for all t $ 0.
32 There are a number of similar appeals to the envelope
theorem in this Appendix. Rigorous proofs can use results
from Earl A. Coddington and Norman Levinson (1955, Ch.
1.7), concerning the dependence of the solution to a differ-
ential equation on various parameters.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
Requiring m9(s)J 5 21, for all J . 0 and
s 5 0 for all J # 0 de nes s( J) as a continuous
function. Now if
dJ
dt
5 2 F(K, t) 1 s( J) 1
m(s( J))J 5 ( J, t), then satis es a
Lipshitz condition in J and there is a unique
solution for J. Since J # 0 implies that
dJ
dt
#
2F(K, t) , 0, if t [ (0, T ), it follows
that J . 0 for all t [ [0, T ). Hence 2J9(t) $
2m(sˆ)J(t) 2 sˆ 1 F(K, t), for all feasible sˆ
over [0, T ). If pˆ(t, t) 5 exp 2 t
t m(sˆ(t9))
dt9, it follows that t
T pˆ(t, t)(F(K, t) 2 sˆ(t))
dt#2pˆ(t, t)J(t)zt
T5 J(t). Hence s is optimal and
J(t) is the value function, W(K, t). Also, any sˆ
that differs from s on a set of positive measure
is strictly inferior. The value of WK(K, t) fol-
lows from the envelope theorem, as does that of
dM~t!
dt
.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3(a):
De ne s( J) as in the proof of Lemma 4. Now
let
dJ
dt
5 ~ J, t! 5 2F~K0 1 v#t, t! 1
v# 1 s~ J! 1 m~s~ J!!J, for all t [ [0, t],
with terminal condition J(t) 5 W(K0 1 v# t, t),
for W as in equation (4). Since is Lipshitz,
there is a unique solution for J, although, for
nonoptimal t, this J may be nonpositive, so
that s( J) is zero. Nevertheless, 2J9(t) $
2m(sˆ)J(t) 2 sˆ 2 v# 1 F(K, t), for all feasible
sˆ over [0, t), so that, as in the proof of Lemma
4, s is the essentially unique optimal path and J
is the value function, J(0) 5 M(t) . 0. Note
that
dJ~0!
dt
5 m~s~0!!J 1 s~0! 1 v# .
0, so that
dm~s~t!!
dt
, 0, for all t close enough
to 0. Further, equation (5) implies that, if t $
tˆ . t*, then
dJ
dt
, 0, so that
dm
dt
. 0.
Indeed, note that, if
dJ
dt
$ 0, at any t . tˆ, then
d2J
dt2
5 2F t ~K*, t! 1 m
dJ
dt
. 0, so that
dJ
dt
. 0, for all suf ciently large t, contradict-
ing J(T) 5 0. If, on the other hand,
dJ
dt
5 0 at
tˆ, then
d2J
dt2
5 0, but
d3J
dt3
. 0, since Ftt(K*,
tˆ) , 0, so this contradiction still follows. At
t* , tˆ, the drop in y implies that
dJ1
dt
,
dJ2
dt
. Further, if
dJ
dt
5 0 at some t# , tˆ, t# Þ t*,
then
d2J
dt2
5 2F t ~K*, t#! , 0 at t#. It fol-
lows that J is strictly increasing for t [
[0, t#) and strictly decreasing for t [ (t#, T],
for some t# , tˆ, where t# may or may not
be t*.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3(b):
This is analogous to the proof of Theorem
1(b).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4(a):
Note that Wa (K*, t, a) 5 ( p(t))
21 3
t
T p(t)Fa(K*, t, a) dt, for all t [ [t*, T] and
Wa t(K*, t, a) 5 m(s(t))Wa(K*, t, a) 2
Fa (K*, t, a). It is immediate that Wa(K*, t,
a) . 0, for all t [ [t†, T ). Further, if Wa(K*,
t, a) 5 0, for any t9 [ (t*, t†), then Wa t(K*,
t9, a) . 0, so that Wa(K*, t, a) , 0 for all
t [ [t*, t9). Since, by assumption,Wa(K*, t*,
a) $ 0, it follows that Wa (K*, t, a) . 0, for
all t [ (t*, T). Since m9(s(t, a))W(K*, t,
a) 5 21, it also follows that
­s~t, a!
­a
K5K*
.
0, for all t [ (t*, T). Given WK(K*, t*, a)
as in Lemma 4, WKa ~K*, t*, a! 5
t*
T
d
da
p~t!
p~t*!
K5K*
FK(K*, t, a) dt 1 (p(t*))
21 3
t*
T p(t)FKa (K*, t, a) dt . 0. From
WK(K*, t*, a) 5 1 and Assumption 6,
dt*
da
5
2
WKa ~K*, t*, a!
WKK ~K*, t*, a!v# 1 WKt ~K*, t*, a!
. 0,
and hence
dK*
da
. 0. Hence
­s~t, a!
­a
5
­s~t, a!
­a
K5K*
2
m9~s~t, a!!WK~K*, t, a!
m0~s~t, a!!W~K*, t, a!
dK*
da
.
0, for all t [ (t*, T]. Finally, since Ja(t, a)$ 0, for
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J as in the proof of Theorem 3(a),
­s~t, a!
­a
$ 0,
for all t [ [0, t*).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4(b):
Using the envelope theorem, Wb ~K*, t,
b! 5 t
T
­
­b
p~t!
p~t!
~F~K*, t! 2 s~t!! dt 5
2 t
T
p~t!
p~t!
~t 2 t!~F~K*, t! 2 s~t!! dt, for
all t [ [t*, T]. Applying integration by parts, it
follows that Wb(K*, t, b) 5 2( p(t))
21 3
t
T p(t)W(K, t, b) dt , 0, for all t [ [t*, T),
since W(K, t, b) . 0, for all t [ [0, T). From
m9(s(t, b))W(K*, t, b) 5 21, it follows that
­s~t, b!
­b K5K*
, 0, for all t [ [t*, T). Given
WK(K*, t*, b) as in Lemma 4, WKb~K*, t*, b!
5 t*
T
d
db
p~t!
p~t*!
K5K*
FK ~K*, t! dt , 0. The re-
sults then follow as in (a).
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